Selected Usages

“Non-Business Day”

The other day I saw the following tweet, mentioning a post by Ruth Gámez and Fernando Cuñado: Diccionario de #ingles jurídico: «business day» vs. «non-business day» I @traduccionjurid https://t.co/r31BKQaDOV — Leon Hunter SLU (@LeonHunterSL) October 13, 2016 I realized in quick succession that (1) I hadn’t encountered the term non-business day and (2) it’s massively lame. So is non-working day. A … Read More

“Fails To” Versus “Does Not”

The phrase fails to (and its variants) is utterly standard in contracts, but you could always use instead does not (and its variants). Some grubby examples from EDGAR: The Indemnifying Party shall not be relieved of its obligations to indemnify the Indemnified Party with respect to such claim if the Indemnified Party fails to [read does not] timely deliver the Indemnity … Read More

“Directly”

The word directly comes in handy if you want to say in a contract that a party is allowed to do something, or is prohibited from doing something, directly or indirectly. Some examples from the Berkeley Pit that is EDGAR: Executive shall not directly or indirectly render any services of a business, commercial, or professional nature to any other person … … Read More

Doctrinal Terms of Art and Contract Language: They’re Different

This week I revisited my 2012 post on rethinking the “no assignment” provision (here). It reminded me that there’s a general point buried in that post. Here it is: It’s commonplace for contracts to contain something along the following lines: Neither party may assign this agreement without the consent of the other party. In Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate (Tina Stark … Read More

“So Long As”

In everyday English, the phrase so long as means if. As in, You may go to the movies, so long as Juanita goes too. It’s used to convey that meaning in contracts too. I’m here to tell you that you should use if instead, as in the following examples that I caught in an EDGAR glue trap: During the Restricted … Read More

More Underwhelming English Caselaw on “Warrants”

Via this IP Draughts post, we learn that another English court has held that if a set of statements of fact is introduced by warrants, those statements of fact do not also constitute representations giving rise to a claim for damages under the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Mark notes that this opinion is of limited interest, as it involves only a hearing of an application for summary … Read More

“Including at Least”

This week a reader asked me about including at least—yet another phrase I’d never thought about before. That phrase is unobjectionable when it’s used to express that a given set must including a minimum number, or minimum proportion, of something or other. Here are some random examples from EDGAR: … the Parties shall refer such dispute to the Chief Executive … Read More

Yet Another “Efforts” Standard: “Good Efforts”!

Longtime readers will know that I make it a point periodically to prod the carcass that is the notion that different efforts standards impose obligations of different levels of onerousness. Well, it’s time to prod the carcass once more. This morning I used the phrase good reason. That led me to ponder the rhetorical function of good in that phrase—what’s the … Read More

Defining “Knowledge” to Include What Someone Should Have Known

Starting at 13.364, MSCD considers the elements that go into a definition of the defined term Knowledge. One element that discussion doesn’t include is the possibility of Knowledge being defined to include information that the person in question should have known. That’s knows as “constructive knowledge,” and it features in the following definitions exhumed from the potter’s field EDGAR. “Knowledge” … Read More

“Aforesaid” and “Aforementioned”

You recall my recent post about the foregoing (here)? Well, suppress your gag reflex and meet its close relatives, aforesaid and aforementioned. The word aforesaid comes in two flavors. First, it occurs in the phrase as aforesaid: Each such notice, request or other communication shall be effective (i) if given by mail, 72 hours after such communication is deposited in the … Read More